The strategy that invited defeat

July 27, 2026 12:22 am

Toluwalope Shodunke

In 1966, England hosted the World Cup. That year, football came home and stayed at home, as England won the tournament.

Since then, English football fans have been longing for another football triumph. This longing has turned “It’s coming home” into a catchphrase and shibboleth among the English fans. The phrase originated from the song “Three Lions”, written in 1996 by comedians David Baddiel, Frank Skinner and Ian Broudie with the Lightning Seeds band, to promote England’s hosting of UEFA Euro 96.

In many instances, such as the 2018 World Cup, Euro 2020 and the 2024 final, the refrain reached a crescendo. However, with losses to Croatia in the 2018 World Cup semi-final, Italy in the Euro 2020 final (played in 2021), and Spain in the Euro 2024 final, the anthem of hope became a hum with cracked voices.

To ensure England emerged as winners in the just-concluded 2026 World Cup, Thomas Tuchel was given the task of coaching the team.

With two wins and one draw, they qualified from the group stage, beating DR Congo in the Round of 32, Mexico and Norway at different stages, to set a date with Argentina in the semi-final.

Before the Argentina match, England showed some of their capabilities. Against DR Congo, they showed a sense of urgency and the firepower of their attack. With Mexico, even with Jarell Quansah’s red card, they still retreated and fought with grit. Against Norway, they showed ruthlessness in finishing.

By the time England faced Argentina, a multitude of English fans were already singing “It’s coming home” with various percussion instruments infused into the song. Then England scored… and acoustic and string instruments joined the emerging rhythm. Argentina scored. The music stopped abruptly; the English team retreated. They could barely string two passes together; Argentina scored the second goal. England was out; football was not coming home. Everybody was asking why. Was it fatigue? Inferiority complex? We all scratched our heads, asking why.

ESPN FC talked about the 11 men England put behind the ball after they scored, just as Adam Craig questioned the fortress-like defending England has used for decades. Thomas Müller was shocked by the way England allowed Argentina to make crosses. For Michael Owen, it was England’s lack of bravery in controlling possession that piqued him.

All these can be codified in just one word: strategy. As a top manager, Tuchel’s strategy was not wrong. Rather, I see traces of overthinking, a lack of clarity about the players’ path, and a slow adaptation to the entropy that was emerging in the game. In any competitive terrain, the right strategy must be applied at the right time and executed in the right way to achieve victory.

By “packing the bus” with 11 men behind the ball and having just 12 per cent of ball possession between Gordon’s goal in the 55th minute and Martínez’s goal in the 92nd minute, the English players constructed a Maginot Line as the French did against the German invasion.

The Maginot Line is a fortification named after the French Minister of War, André Maginot. Built in the 1930s to protect France against German invasion. But no system can be impregnable in perpetuity.

The English team built a Maginot Line by bringing in Dan Burn and Nico O’Reilly to add to the players staying in the six-yard box to protect their lead. They forgot that strategy must move with momentum and that no defence system can be impregnable indefinitely. Just like the Germans bypassed the Maginot Line through the Ardennes, the Argentines didn’t play through the centre; rather, they delivered well-tailored crosses to bypass England’s fortification.

Strategy is active and in consonance with Ecclesiastes 3:1 (KJV): “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven.” There are seasons for winning, drawing or losing. The strategy for each season varies, and the timing of its application is crucial in changing the tide.

It is the changing face of strategy that forms the muscle of John Boyd’s OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), developed in the ‘70s.

Basically, the OODA loop revolves around observation, filtering what you observed for insights, deciding what to do and prompt execution. Scaloni observed they were chasing a game; he brought in Nico González, a winger, in the 64th minute to push England back. For England, Tuchel should have observed that the Argentine team were having problems coping when his wingers ran at them, but he decided to remove his threat (Gordon), brought in a defender, Ezri Konsa, with Saka and Rashford on the bench.

In the 72nd minute alone, Scaloni made three changes. In one of those changes, Rodrigo De Paul, a box-to-box player with the lungs of a horse, was introduced to increase the pace of Argentina.

As of the 81st minute, the Argentines had completed their five substitutions; England had just made one. It shows Scaloni’s decisions passing through the OODA loop lens. By observing, orienting and having appropriate plans at different segments of the game, he nullified Tuchel’s one-way thinking.

David Ogilvy, the father of modern advertising, is often credited with the saying: “Strategy is sacrifice.” This implies making choices. And indeed, the two gaffers made choices, while Scaloni sacrificed Nicolás Tagliafico (defender) for Lautaro Martínez (striker), who scored the winning goal. Tuchel sacrificed Kobbie Mainoo, a player who symbolises control, on the bench, for defenders. Scaloni’s choice is to attack; Tuchel’s choice is to secure his lead.

For now, with two semi-final exits in two World Cups and two final defeats in European finals, football isn’t coming home yet. It is still in transit. Over the years, we’ve seen what the English team can do. But they can only break the ceiling if they adhere to the holy grail that is strategy; it is not static. It is active. Now is the time!

Toluwalope Shodunke, a media practitioner, writes via [email protected]

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